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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

RAFAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ,

Case No. 20150755

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103 (2)(e) (2012). Addendum
A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's motion to bar retrial on
double jeopardy grounds when its factual findings regarding prosecutorial intent were
clearly erroneous?
Standard ofReview and Preservation: "Where the issue is purely factual, appellate
review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly erroneous."
Drake v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Utah R. Civ. P.
~

52(a)(4) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.").
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Reyes-Gutierrez preserved this issue by filing a Motion To Bar Retrial On Double
Jeopardy Grounds and Memorandum in Support Thereof pursuant to Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U.S. 667 (1982) and State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ,I 149, 20 P.3d 342. See
Addendum B. This issue is also preserved through oral argument. R.477-506.
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are attached at Addendum C: U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const.
art. I,§ 12; Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-602; Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-6(2)(a); Utah R. Prof'l
Conduct 3. 7.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

Procedural History
1. Pretrial Proceedings and Pretrial Motions
Rafael Reyes-Gutierrez was charged with one count of retail theft, a class A
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code§ 76-6-602, on October 22, 2014. R.1-3. A
preliminary hearing was held on January 20, 2015 before the Honorable Laura Scott.
R.40-41. At the preliminary hearing, the City called Officer Edmundson as its only live
witness and admitted an 1102 statement from Wal-Mart's loss prevention officer over the
objection of Reyes-Gutierrez. R.40-41, 53. The City did not introduce any video
surveillance during the preliminary hearing. R. 51-60. Judge Scott bound the case over to
the district court based on the officer's testimony and the 1102 statement from the loss
prevention employee. R.59.
Reyes-Gutierrez subsequently filed a motion to quash the bindover. R.44-60. In
the motion to quash, Reyes-Gutierrez argued, inter alia, that the bindover should be
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

quashed because the magistrate should not have admitted the 1102 statement from the
loss prevention employee because that statement only should be admitted if there is not
an original recording to prove the content pursuant to rule 1002. R.44-49. In this case, the
testimony from Officer Edmundson is that his report of the alleged crime essentially
"mirrored" the statement written by the asset protection associate. R.56. The Officer
further testified he was provided with security camera video, but did not review it, and
relied solely on the asset protection associate to identify and arrest Reyes-Gutierrez.
R.56-57. The trial court denied the motion to quash the bindover and the matter was set

0u

for a pretrial conference. R. 71-72.
Neither party filed any other pretrial motions. R.71-75. A jury trial was scheduled
for May 26, 2015. R.71-75. The City did not provide any notice of its intent to introduce
404(b) evidence relating to Reyes-Gutierrez's prior retail theft convictions. R.496.
Prior to trial, Reyes-Gutierrez, through counsel, contacted the City prosecutor
regarding the functionality of the surveillance footage. R.428. Neither the prosecution nor
Reyes-Gutierrez was able to get the surveillance footage to play and the prosecution did
not have another functioning copy of the surveillance footage. Id.

2. May 26, 2015 Jury Trial Proceedings
On May 26, 2015, the parties convened for a jury trial. R.106-108. The City was
represented by two prosecutors Brandon Simmons and Padma Veeru-Collins. R.269.
Before voir dire began, Reyes-Gutierrez made a motion to bifurcate the proceeding.

1

1

Reyes-Gutierrez was charged with retail theft that was enhanced to a class A misdemeanor
based on prior convictions.

3
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R.269. The City did not object and Reyes-Gutierrez indicated he would stipulate to the
enhancement as a class A misdemeanor if the City proved the underlying substantive
offense of retail theft. R.269, 270. In Reyes-Gutierrez' opening statement, defense
counsel raised the possibility that the alleged theft was actually "a simple human error" or
mistake. R.366-367.
City prosecutor Simmons conducted direct examination of both of its two
witnesses. R.368, 399. The asset protection associate testified on cross-examination,
without objection from the City, that the alleged theft was recorded on video, he gave the
video to police, and he did not bring the video to court for trial. R.386-387. On re-direct,
City prosecutor Simmons elicited testimony that Walmart surveillance videos do not
always work. R.393. Walmart video recordings came up again on both re-cross
examination and further re-direct examination. R.395 (Walmart's ability to preserve
video recordings), R.397 (asset protection associate's familiarity with Walmart video
files).
The City's second witness, Salt Lake City Police Officer Edmundson, testified on
direct examination that he has viewed video surveillance footage in the Walmart loss
prevention office before, but didn't recall ifhe did in this case. R.403. Reyes-Gutierrez
elicited testimony on cross-examination, again without objection from the City, that
Officer Edmundson in fact received a copy of the Walmart video in this case, but did not
review or bring the video to court. R.405. Following Officer Edmundson's testimony, the
Court took a lunch recess at the City's request. R.408. Outside the presence of the jury,
City prosecutor Simmons stated "I'm looking to see if I can develop some evidence about
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the non-functionality of the video." R.409. The parties then discussed jury instructions,
during which the City informally requested a jury instruction that the Walmart video in
this case was non-functional. R.414-415. The City expressed concern that ReyesGutierrez' cross-examination of Officer Edmundsen suggested the video was possibly
missing or withheld, stating, "we might be creating a situation where the jury thinks that
there maybe was a video but that the city hasn't provided it or that there never was a
video. I think it would be appropriate to notify the jury that there is a video, the
prosecution provided it to the defense, neither side has been able to make it work."
R.414-415. The Court refused to so instruct the jury about the video, R.415, unless the
parties stipulated to an instruction, R.416. The City continued "[the video] has been
provided, we have tried numerous times to get it to work but it is an issue with Walmart's
system and so - but the line of questioning that developed during cross examination
seemed to suggest that it was, that there was something that was not proper and that was
our concern." R.415. The City admitted to a tactical reason for not objecting to defense
counsel's questioning: "we didn't want to raise it while the jury was present to draw
undue attention to it but wanted to handle it outside the privy of the jury." R.415. As a
means to address the video, the City acknowledged it would be unwise to call defense
counsel to testify: "I also don't know that the appropriate response is to call [defense
counsel] to ask her to testify about whether I provided her the video, whether she was
able to get it to work." R.415. The City stated there were potential alternative witnesses,
other than defense counsel or one of the prosecutors. R.417 ("there's a potential then that
we may need to bring in an additional witness whose not on the witness list, Officer
5
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Faulkner or Officer Vicki Aubrey who attempted to assist with the working ... [to testify]
[t]hat the video was not working"). The City requested a stipulated jury instruction
"indicating a video was provided, that it's not working," because "I'm just concerned that
otherwise I'll have to call [defense counsel] to testify." R.416-417. The Court went off
the record until the end of the noon recess, to give the parties time to confer and decide
how the City would address the video. R.417-418.
After the break, and upon Reyes-Gutierrez's refusal to stipulate to a jury
instruction and the City learning he did not intend to testify, the City argued for one of
two remedies: (1) a mistrial, or (2) admission of Reyes-Gutierrez's prior retail theft
convictions to negate the mistake defense raised in opening. R.419-420. The City put the
following on the record: "there were statements made in openings ... that the evidence
would be that this in fact was an error ... - my understanding at this point is that the
defendant does not intend to testify. If that's the case then the jury has been provided
with ... statements - I understand that it's opening statement and so it's argument but it's
been presented as fact and it's opened the jury's mind to the idea that it was an error and
the evidence would be provided to that effect when in fact it has not." R.419-420.
Because "that door has been opened" the City requested a mistrial "be declared based on
the fact that evidence was put in front of the jury that changes essentially the whole
landscape where the defendant is claiming [mistake] without an opportunity to be cross
examined and without the City having an opportunity to ... argue in closing that. .. because
he didn't testify those facts, you know, we should take that the other way. The City has to
be very, very careful about what we say about his decision not to testify in closing and so
6
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as a result of that the City's argument is that either a mistrial would be appropriate or else
that the City should be able to present evidence contrary to the assertion ... that it was a
mistake or that it was human error ... by showing evidence of prior convictions." R.420.
Reyes-Gutierrez objected to both a mistrial and admission of his prior convictions,
raising 403 and 404(b) objections to his prior convictions and arguing opening statements
were not evidence and were supported by inferences in the City's evidence. R.420-421.
The Court denied the City's oral motions for a mistrial and admission of prior
convictions, expressing agreement with the defense that opening statements are not
evidence that can open the door to the prior convictions and "there might be some
inference that can be made based on the evidence that has been presented in the State's
case in chief to support some or all of the arguments made by the defense during opening
statements." R.423.
The parties then had an opportunity to review questions submitted by jurors, and
address the video issue. R.423-425. Reyes-Gutierrez did not agree to stipulate to a jury
instruction that the video was non-functional, R.424-425, and then the City indicated it
would call defense counsel as a witness. R.425. Defense counsel stated she would need to
move for a mistrial if the City did in fact attempt to call her as a witness. R.426. The
Court stated it would declare a mistrial if Reyes-Gutierrez consented to a mistrial and
"make a record that if it's retried there's no double jeopardy... " R.426. The Court
continued, "if I were sitting as a juror based on the current state of the evidence, I might
be convinced there's some videotape lurking out there ... [T]he questioning thus
far ... [leaves] the impression that there was a videotape turned over to the city that the
7
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city has ... chosen not to use or it is lost or something of that nature. So it may be
necessary to put on evidence to counter that. The question is, how do you put on that
evidence[?]" R.426-427. The City stated "I'm being forced to ... come up with witnesses,"
R.428, and "maybe I would call someone from [defense counsel's] office to testify that
they received it, maybe somebody else from her office ... " R.428-429. The Court asked
the City to consider whether there were alternative witnesses to defense counsel. R.429.
After a brief recess for the parties to decide how they wished to proceed, R.430,
the City announced it would call defense counsel to testify "in light of the jury question
where one of the jurors said I would very much like to see the surveillance video or still
images if it's available to watch." R.431. Defense counsel objected and repeated her
intention to move for a mistrial if called as a witness. R.431-432. After much discussion
between opposing counsel and the Court, the Court addressed defense counsel, indicating
it "may allow the City to call [defense counsel] as a witness or- unless there's somebody
else at your office. Are you moving for a mistrial?" R.437. Defense again confirmed she
would move for a mistrial if called as a witness for the City. R.43 7.
The City then announced it would call City prosecutor Simmons, one of two
prosecutors at trial, to testify in lieu of defense counsel. R.438. Defense counsel objected,
R.438, and after argument and immediately following the Court's announcement it would
make a final ruling on the matter, the City stated it would stipulate to a mistrial if ReyesGutierrez moved for a mistrial. R.440. Defense counsel clarified she would move for a
mistrial only if the Court were to allow either attorney to be called as a witness. R.440441. The Court ruled it would allow City prosecutor Simmons' testimony and,

8
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recognizing defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, confirmed the City's stipulation.
<iv

R.441-442. The Court asked if either party wanted Reyes-Gutierrez's explicit consent to
the mistrial, and the City requested Reyes-Gutierrez "specifically to stipulate." R.442.
After consulting with defense counsel, Reyes-Gutierrez consented to the mistrial on the
record and the Court declared a mistrial. R.443-444. Immediately, the City requested "for
the Court to put on the record that jeopardy does not attach because of the case [State v.
Manatau, 2014 UT 7,322 P.3d 739] the Court is referring to." R.445. The Court
explicitly stated its finding "that jeopardy has not attached." R.445. The Court suggested
~

setting trial for the following day, and the City stated it needed more time because it
would have "a motion in limine and probably some notices to file since we're not doing
this today." R.445. Specifically, the City announced it would file 404(b) notices and "a
motion in limine to limit or prevent mention of the video in the case." R.448. After
discussion with the parties, the Court scheduled a retrial date, pretrial hearing, and motion
filing deadlines. R.447-449.

3. Motions Filed After the First Trial and Motion Hearing
On June 8, 2015, the City filed Notice of Intent to Rely on 404(b) Evidence at
Trial. R.115-116. On the same date, the City filed Motion in Limine to Deny the
Admission of Prejudicial or Confusing Evidence. R.119-121.
On June 10, 2015, Reyes-Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Preserve Evidence, R.124-134, and Motion to Bar Retrial on Double Jeopardy Grounds
and Memorandum in Support Thereof, R.139-149. The Motion to Dismiss was later
withdrawn on June 23, 2015, shortly after defense counsel was able to access the
9
0
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surveillance video. R.182.
On June 17, 2015, Reyes-Gutierrez filed Memorandum in Opposition to City's
Notice of Intent to Rely on 404(b) Evidence at Trial, R.164-168, and Memorandum in
Opposition to City's Motion In Limine to Deny the Admission of Prejudicial or
Confusing Evidence, R.1 71-177.
The motions were addressed by the Court at a final pretrial conference hearing on
June 29, 2015. R.474. City prosecutor Simmons offered sworn testimony as to his intent
at the first trial. R.485. Simmons testified it was his intention to complete the trial, R.486,
and that he was "the only one that could testify about my efforts to make [the video]
work and that was very important to me to let the jury know that the City wasn't hiding
anything, that the City had tried very hard to present this evidence to the jury." R.487.
Simmons then said defense counsel would have been the best witness, and that he
couldn't get someone else from defense counsel's office because defense counsel hadn't
told him who had "tried to get the video to work." R.487. Furthermore, "[b]y the time the
defendant's motion for mistrial, basically it was so clear from [defense counsel]'s strong
objections that she would be moving, you know, appeal seemed very, an interlocutory
appeal or some other sort of appeal seemed very likely and at that point it just wasn't
worth the trouble where the trial process had already broken down so far and so we
stipulated to the defense's motion." R.488. Simmons testified that the trial broke down
"[i]n my opinion ... because of the way that the defense handled the issue of the video and
the testimony about it." R.488. Simmons continued that he was out of options at the first
trial, "if I'm forced to a mistrial ... I'm going to do things differently the second time
10
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around. I'm going to file a motion in limine to prevent the whole issue from coming up.
I'm going to present additional evidence ... with the evidence of the prior convictions ... I
thought it was appropriate to do it again. That's why I didn't object." R.488-489. On
cross-examination, Simmons testified that he sat down with an officer during a break
from the first trial and tried to play the video, which didn't work, but Simmons did not
call the officer as a witness of the non-functioning video. R.490-492. Simmons explained
he didn't call the officer or the asset protection officer because they didn't have
"technical knowledge of the video. They just knew they were clicking on files I had
showed them and when they clicked on them, nothing happened." R.491-492. Simmons
also agreed that none of defense counsel's video-related questions at trial were inaccurate
or elicited inaccurate facts. R.497-500.
Based on the hearing and the Court's recollection of the trial, the Court denied
Reyes-Gutierrez's motion and made a finding of fact "that the purpose that the City
intended in asking that Mr. Simmons be allowed to testify was to get certain facts before
the jury and not to obtain a mistrial and not to goad the defense into making a motion for
a mistrial." R.507. The Court noted that the City's stipulation "may have been a tactical
decision to avoid appeal issues or other reasons but even if that were a tactical decision
by the City to stipulate to the motion for a mistrial made by the defense, the request to
call Mr. Simmons as a witness and so forth were not made based on what I heard and the
facts of this case to goad the defendant into asking for a mistrial." R.507. Additionally,
the Court said it "would not have prohibited the City from putting on evidence to [sic]
appropriate witnesses or a witness that. .. there was a video at the Walmart, that the video
11
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was provided to the city or to the police and then thereafter provided to the defense and
that no one could get the video to work." R.508. In restating its finding of the nonexistence of prosecutorial intent, the Court said "I acknowledge that the City's choice to
stipulate to the mistrial once made could have been a tactical decision, but I think there
are frankly black shadows attributed to this case that are not there." R.509. Additionally,
the Court found "this was a situation where the attorneys and frankly the Court are, were
doing their best to address fast moving issues ... and the lawyers were doing their best ... to
make the best decisions that they could and there was not a decision by the City to goad
the defendant into moving for a mistrial and then stipulating to a mistrial out of a desire
to get a mistrial in this case." R.509.
Following argument on the 404(b) notice and motion in limine, the Court ruled
~

that one of Reyes-Gutierrez's three prior theft convictions would be admissible at the
second trial. R.527-528. The Court found that the admissible prior incident was within
one year of the current crime, R.527, and had "very substantial similarity" to the pending
case, R.526, and there were "very strong or similar patterns between the two crimes" that
would rebut the defense of mistake. R.526.
ft!v

4. June 30, 2015 Jury Trial Proceedings and Sentencing
On June 30, 2015, the parties convened for the second jury trial. R.237-239.
Reyes-Gutierrez was convicted by the jury. R.242. On August 14, 2015, Reyes-Gutierrez
was sentenced to 18 months of supervised probation, 7 days jail, 50 hours of community
service, and $150.00 in attorney fees. R.254-255. Reyes-Gutierrez timely appealed.
R.257-258.
12
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(i)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah and federal double jeopardy protections safeguard a defendant from facing
multiple prosecutions for the same crime. U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. I,§ 12;
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-6(2)(a). Generally, double jeopardy bars a defendant's retrial for
a crime when the defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial, unless the mistrial was
declared with either defendant's consent or for reason oflegal necessity. See, e.g., United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1971) (plurality opinion); State v. Manatau, 2014
UT 7, ,r,r 10-11, 322 P.3d 739. However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that double jeopardy protects defendants who have been intentionally goaded by the
prosecution into moving for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,673 (1982).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a "defendant's valued right to complete
his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion for mistrial
were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of double jeopardy in all circumstances"
and that the federal "Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against
governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests." Id. at 673-674.
Utah, and other state courts, have also recognized an exception to the general rule
that retrial is not barred when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial when it is the
intent of the prosecutor to "provoke a mistrial in order to provide the prosecution with a
more favorable opportunity to convict." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ,r 149, 20 P.3d
342; see also State v. Parker, 707 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 2011). This exception serves to
protect Reyes-Gutierrez from retrial in this case.
Prosecutorial intent is a finding of fact to be determined by the trial court.
13
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Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675. But this Court need not defer to the trial court's finding if it is
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997). The record clearly indicates the City prosecutors intended to goad ReyesGutierrez into moving for a mistrial. For that reason, the trial court clearly erred in
finding to the contrary, and Reyes-Gutierrez' Motion to Bar Retrial ought to have been
granted.
ARGUMENT

I.

Federal and State Double Jeopardy Clauses Protect A Defendant From
Retrial When A Prosecutor Intentionally Goads The Defendant Into
Moving For A Mistrial

Gfr.,

"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant from repeated prosecutions for the same offense." Kennedy, 456 U.S.at 671
(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,606, 96 S. Ct. 1075 (1976)). In a jury trial,
'jeopardy attaches when a jury has been empaneled and sworn." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
28, 38, 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978). Among the rights protected by the double jeopardy clause

~

is the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."

Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S. Ct. 834 (1949).
As a general rule, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent the government
from retrying a defendant when the defendant makes '"a deliberate election to forgo his
valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact"' by
moving for a mistrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 93, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978)). However, the United States Supreme Court has
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~

recognized "when judicial or prosecutorial error seriously prejudices a defendant, he may
~

have little interest in completing the trial and obtaining a verdict from the first jury."

Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial "for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding." Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141
(1978). When a defendant is seriously prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct to the
extent that defendant is driven to move for a mistrial, the "defendant's mistrial request
has objectives not unlike the interests served by the Double Jeopardy Clause the
avoidance of the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions."

Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608.
The United States Supreme Court has held, '"[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause does
protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests
and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple
prosecutions."' Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674 (quoting Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611). In Kennedy,
the Court considered its own precedent and articulated a "narrow exception to the rule
that the Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial." 456 U.S. at 673 (citing, e.g., United

States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980); Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611;
Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 (plurality opinion); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468, n.3,
84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964)). Specifically, "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question
is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the
bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his
own motion." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. If defendant's mistrial motion is predicated on
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mere prosecutorial or judicial error, or even "harassment or overreaching", then double
jeopardy "does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the
protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-676;

DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130 ("reprosecution of a defendant who has successfully
moved for a mistrial is not barred, so long as the Government did not deliberately seek to
provoke the mistrial request"). Absent such intent, "a prosecutor's error in questioning a
~

witness, improper remark in a closing statement, and even extensive misconduct do not
prevent reprosecution." United States v. Curry, 328 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2003)
(citation and quotations omitted). However, a defendant may not be retried following his
successful motion for a mistrial, where "the conduct giving rise to the successful motion
for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial."
~

Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).
The Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794,
89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969). Double jeopardy protections are codified in Utah Code section 77l-6(2)(a). Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(2)(a) ("no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense"). Utah courts have found that "[t]he United States Constitution, the
Utah State Constitution, and Utah Code section 77-l-6(2)(a) each contain double
jeopardy clauses with the same content." State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah
1998) (citing McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1983)). As under federal law,
jeopardy attaches in a Utah jury trial when the jury is sworn and empaneled. Manatau,
2014 UT 7, ,I 9; McNair, 666 P.2d at 325 fn 7 ("The Utah rule that jeopardy attaches
16
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when the jury is impaneled and sworn is the same as the rule now binding on the states as
a matter of federal constitutional law." (internal citations omitted)). "Once a mistrial has
been declared, a retrial may proceed without offending Utah's constitutional double
jeopardy provision only if one of two exceptions applies: (1) the defendant consents to
the mistrial or (2) there is "legal necessity" for the mistrial." Manatau, 2014 UT 7, if 10
(citing State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, iJ 24, 104 P.3d 1250). Thus, a defendant generally
waives a double jeopardy challenge to a retrial when he or she successfully moves for a
mistrial. State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990) ("Generally, if a defendant seeks
a mistrial, he waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy,
even though the prosecution or the court provoked the error."). The Utah Supreme Court
recognizes the exception delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy, that
"double jeopardy can bar retrial. .. where a judge or prosecutor acts in bad faith with the
intent to provoke a mistrial in order to provide the prosecution with a more favorable
opportunity to convict." Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, iJ149 (citing Trafny, 799 P.2d at 709).
II.

The Trial Court Clearly Erred In Finding An Absence Of
Prosecutorial Intent To Provoke A Mistrial On Reyes-Gutierrez'
Motion, Because The City's Conduct Demonstrates Such Intent So
That It Could Have A More Favorable Opportunity To Convict ReyesGutierrez At A Second Trial
The City made a number of strategic decisions at trial that clearly evidenced its

'<P

intent to provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial. A mistrial and subsequent
retrial would give the City the opportunity to admit into evidence Reyes-Gutierrez' prior
convictions for a similar crime, and prevent defense counsel from thoroughly crossexamining the City's witnesses on lost evidence. The clear weight of the evidence
17
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conflicts with the trial court's finding that the City did not intend to provoke a mistrial,
and this Court should not defer to the trial court's finding.
a. Prosecutorial intent is a finding offact to be made by the trial court,
inferred from objective facts and circumstances, and the reviewing
court will defer to the trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous.
Under both state and federal double jeopardy analyses, evaluation of prosecutorial
intent is key to deciding whether double jeopardy bars a retrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at
675-676. The determination of whether a prosecutor acted with the intent to provoke a
mistrial is a finding of fact to be made by the trial court. Id. at 675. The trial court's
finding of fact as to the prosecutor's intent may be inferred from "objective facts and
circumstances." Id. This Court shall defer to the trial court's finding of fact unless it is
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard

~

shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witness."); see Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500,502 (Utah 1996) ("[T]he propriety of a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question oflaw that we review
for correctness.")(citation omitted); see State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)
("Because of the trial court's position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and
other factors bearing on credibility, we will not disturb its factual assessment underlying
a decision to grant or deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the lower
court was in error."). This Court will not defer to the trial court's finding if it is against
the clear weight of the evidence, such that the Court is left with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
18
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Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S. Ct. 1562 (1969)(citation and quotation omitted).
In Kennedy, after defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial on his motion, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss his case because of double jeopardy. 456 U.S. at 669.
The trial court conducted a hearing that included testimony from the prosecutor, and the
trial court made a finding of fact that double jeopardy did not bar retrial because "it was
not the intention of the prosecutor in this case to cause a mistrial." Id. at 669-670. The
reviewing court accepted the trial court's finding as to a lack of intent, id. at 679, where
the record indicated one improper question asked by the prosecutor of a state's witness.

Id. at 669 (prosecutor asked state's witness if the reason the witness doesn't do business
with the defendant is "because [defendant] is a crook?"). The dissent in Kennedy agreed
with the majority's judgment that double jeopardy did not bar retrial because "[t]he
prosecutor's mistake was not the kind of overreaching or harassment identified in our
precedents as an exception to the general rule" that a defendant's motion for mistrial bars
a double jeopardy challenge to a subsequent retrial. Id. at 681 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Other jurisdictions have evaluated a trial court's determination of whether a
prosecutor intended to circumvent double jeopardy protections. The South Carolina
~

Supreme Court addressed a trial court's determination of prosecutorial intent in State v.
Parker. 391 S.C. 606, 612, 707 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 2011). Parker involved a murder trial,

where defendant made a motion for a mistrial and one was declared on the basis of the
cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 609-610. The misconduct included
the prosecutor's improper statements about defense counsel, argument to the jury it ought
to convict to protect the community, and accidental publication to the jury of a non19
~
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redacted gruesome video. Id. Defendant filed a motion to bar retrial on double jeopardy
grounds, which was heard by a second judge, who made a finding inconsistent with the
trial court's explicit findings on the record as to the cause of the mistrial. Id. at 610-611
(second judge's findings inaccurately stated mistrial was declared on grounds of
deadlocked jury). The South Carolina Supreme Court wrote: "courts have to determine
whether the subjective intent of the solicitor was to cause a mistrial. This is not an easy
task to undertake, because it is almost unimaginable that a solicitor would admit that he
or she took certain actions in an effort to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial." Id.
at 613. The Court recognized the absurdity of determining prosecutor intent based solely
on a prosecutor's statement of his or her intent: "in this case, if we do not hold the
solicitor intentionally caused the defense to move for a mistrial, then it would seem the
only possible way to find that a solicitor intentionally goaded the defense would be for a
solicitor to admit he or she took certain actions in an effort to goad the defense." Id. at
613-614. The Court decided that "[s]tanding alone, any one of these [acts of misconduct]
might not show subjective intent on the part of the solicitor to goad the defense into
seeking a mistrial." Id. at 615. "Rather... the totality of what occurred in the first trial
leads to the conclusion that it was the intent of the solicitor to goad defense counsel to
move for a mistrial." Id.
In State v. Michael J., the Connecticut Supreme Court approved the trial court's
determination of a prosecutor's intent, based on the trial court's observations during trial
and the prosecutor's representation of intent. 274 Conn. 321, 323-24, 875 A.2d 510
(Conn. 2005). In Michael J., the defendant did not provide any information that
20
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contradicted the prosecutor's representation of intent, or that supported "an inference that
the prosecutor had intended to provoke a mistrial. .. " Id. at 334-338. The Court wrote,
"[i]n short, the [defendant] simply did not provide a sufficient basis to initiate a more
~

probing inquiry into the prosecutor's intent." Id. at 337.

b.

The trial court clearly erred in its finding of fact because the record
indicates the City's intention to goad Reyes-Gutierrez into moving
for a mistrial.
The trial court's finding of fact that the City did not intend to cause a mistrial was

clearly erroneous. The City's intent to goad Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial,
in order to secure a more favorable result at a retrial, is evident from the following
objective facts and circumstances. See Kennedy at 675-676. 2
First, the City made a motion for mistrial, which was denied. R.419-420 (City's
Cs}

motion for a mistrial), 422-423 (trial court's denial of mistrial motion). The stated basis

2

The marshalled evidence in support of the trial court's finding that it was not the intent of the
prosecution to provoke a mistrial request is outlined in this section and includes the following:
At a motion hearing after the first trial, prosecutor Simmons was sworn in and offered testimony
R.485-504. Prosecutor Simmons testified that on May 26, 2015, after the prosecution's motion
for a mistrial was denied, the prosecution no longer wanted a mistrial. R.486. Prosecutor
Simmons did not see grounds for a mistrial by calling Reyes-Gutierrez' defense counsel as a
witness and, instead, wanted defense counsel to testify about the functionality of the surveillance
video. Id. Prosecutor Simmons testified that it was "his intention all along" to finish the trial but
that when "things [broke] down so far" that it just made sense to start over. R.488. Prosecutor
Simmons testified that he gave up on "preventing a defense motion for mistrial" and that is why
the prosecution stipulated the defense counsel's motion for a mistrial R.488. Furthermore,
prosecutor Simmons and prosecutor Veeru-Collins had "multiple conversations" and it was their
"agreed upon intention" to finish the trial that had commenced on May 26, 2015. R.487.
Additionally, prosecutor Simmons testified that ifhe was forced into a mistrial by
defense counsel, it would be his practice to do things differently for the next trial by filing a
motion in limine to prevent the same issues from reoccurring and present additional evidence.
R.488. Regardless, prosecutor Simmons testified he "did not have any intention" to provoke a
mistrial and he "certainly never made any efforts to trick anybody else into requesting one."
R.489.
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for the motion was the disadvantaged position the City was in to rebut Reyes-Gutierrez'
opening statement. R.419-420. In Reyes-Gutierrez' opening statement, defense counsel
had raised the possibility that the alleged theft was actually "a simple human error" or
mistake. R.366-367. Following Reyes-Gutierrez' opening, the City went directly into
their first witness and did not object, ask for a bench conference, or otherwise indicate
concerns with the opening statement. R.368. Instead, after the City learned they could not
4v

cross examine Reyes-Gutierrez on lack of mistake or argue his silence in closing, given
his invocation of his constitutional right not to testify at trial, the City sought the extreme
and belated remedy of a mistrial. R.419-420. These circumstances explicitly indicate the
City desired a mistrial in order to create more favorable circumstances for a future
prosecution of Reyes-Gutierrez. Once their mistrial motion was denied, they made
tactical decisions to provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial.
Second, the City simultaneously moved to offer 404(b) evidence of ReyesGutierrez' prior convictions to rebut the same mistake defense. R.419-420. It is clear that
the City had not anticipated Reyes-Gutierrez would present a mistake defense at trial and
had not filed the requisite 404(b) notice that would entitle the City to use past convictions
Gw

at trial to rebut that defense. R.496 (City prosecutor Simmons' testimony he was
surprised when mistake defense raised at first trial). Rather than acknowledge they were
unprepared, the City attempted to circumvent the notice requirement to create more
favorable circumstances to convict Reyes-Gutierrez at a second trial.
Third, the City failed to adequately investigate and secure alternative means to
admit evidence, although it should have known it would be inappropriate to call defense
22
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counsel or a prosecutor as a witness. "That counsel should avoid appearing both as
advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question." United
States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1983). "A lawyer's ability to exercise
independent judgment is obviously placed in a compromising position if the lawyer's
duty as an advocate becomes intermingled with his role as a witness in the same
proceeding." Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549, 553 (Colo. 1985). "The
prohibition against a lawyer acting as both advocate and witness 'is a necessary corollary
to the more fundamental tenet of our adversarial system that juries are to ground their
~

decisions on the facts of a case and not on the integrity or credibility of the advocates."'
People v. Donaldson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 916, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985)). This limits both defense counsel and
government attorneys from calling one other or themselves as witnesses, as "the
prohibition against a prosecutor[] acting as both advocate and witness addresses 'the
concern that jurors will be unduly influenced by the prestige and prominence of the
prosecutor's office and will base their credibility determinations on improper factors."'
Donaldson, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 928-929 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d

~

915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998)).
In a trial where a prosecutor testified to impeach one of the state's witnesses, the
Second Circuit Court held that a "Government prosecutor should not take the stand to
impeach the testimony of Government witnesses unless it is unavoidably necessary."
United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States v. Pepe,
247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957)). "Sitting at the counsel table constitutes sufficient
23
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participation in the trial as to permit the calling of the prosecutor only if and when a
proper foundation has been laid for impeachment and all other sources of possible
testimony have been exhausted." Id. "The rule as stated by Alu is that 'lawyers
representing litigants should not be called as witnesses in trials involving those litigants if
such testimony can be avoided consonant with the end of obtaining justice."' Torres, 503
F.2d at 1126 (quoting United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1957)). The Court
will require a showing all other potential witnesses are unavailable to testify. Id.
In United States v. West, the Court allowed testimony from a prosecutor seated in
the spectator section of the courtroom during trial and who did not participate in any part
of the trial or investigation of defendant. 680 F.2d 652, 654-655 (9th Cir. 1982).
Rule 3.7(a) of Utah's Rules of Professional Conduct governs when counsel may
be called as a witness in a case:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client."
Utah R Prof. Conduct 3.7. While such testimony may not have been inadmissible, Utah
courts have declared "it to be generally inadvisable for members of the bar to testify in
litigation where they personally represent a party. The need for the testimony of counsel
must be compelling and must be necessary to preserve the cause of action as set forth in
[Utah Rules of Professional Conduct] 3.7." Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d
1061, 1065-1066 (Utah 1991), abrogated by Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d
24
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861 (abrogating that regardless on substance, post judgment motions to reconsider do not
toll the time to appeal). A lawyer's testimony is not necessary when alternatives to the
lawyer's testimony are available. See State v. Melancon, 2014 UT App 260, ,r,r 18-19,
339 P.3d 151.
The Utah State Bar has recognized the potential bad faith in calling opposing
counsel, stating that "[c]alling opposing counsel as a witness has been used as a bad-faith
trial tactic to create a disqualification of the client's lawyer to the disadvantage of one of
the parties in the proceeding." UT Eth. Op. 04-02 (Utah St. Bar) 2004 WL 870584, ,r 7.
When counsel for a party learns he or she will be called as a witness in the case,
"[c]oncurrently, the lawyer must determine if there is a conflict of interest under Rule
1.7." Id. at ,r 2. "The attorney should not continue the representation when she is or
ought to be a witness with respect to issues that are not incidental or insignificant." Id. at

The Colorado Supreme Court has considered this issue and concluded "that a
prosecutorial subpoena served upon an accused's attorney can withstand a motion to
quash only if the prosecution demonstrates on the record the existence of the following
factors to support the subpoena: (1) that defense counsel's testimony will be actually
adverse to the accused; (2) that the evidence sought to be elicited from the lawyer will
~

likely be admissible at trial under the controlling rules of evidence; and (3) that there is a
compelling need for such evidence, which need cannot be satisfied by some other
source." Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549, 555-556 (Colo. 1985) (citing United
States v. Schwartzbaum, 527 F.2d 249,253 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Torres, 503
25
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F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974)).
Here, the City intended to call City prosecutor Simmons, who was co-counsel on
the case and actively participated in the trial and pre-trial preparations. R.368
(examination of witness), 399 (examination of witness), 502 (testimony co-counsel was
not involved in pre-trial strategy). It was unnecessary for the City to call either attorney
as a witness on the video issue. When the City announced "I will be asking [defense
~

counsel] to testify," R.431, the City stated the reason as "I think especially in light of the
juror question where one of the jurors said I would very much like to see the surveillance
video or still images if it's available to watch. It's clear this juror clearly wants to know
more ... " R.431. The trial court recognized Reyes-Gutierrez would likely move for a
mistrial, and specifically asked defense counsel whether she would so move. R.437. City
prosecutor Simmons' statement at the motion hearing that he was the "only one that
could testify about my efforts to make [the video] work and that was very important to
me to let the jury know that the City wasn't hiding anything, that the City had tried very
hard to present this evidence to the jury" reveals the City wanted his testimony for a nonrelevant reason, namely that the City "tried very hard." R.487. Whether defense counsel
~

received a non-functioning disc purporting to contain the Walmart surveillance videos
was not relevant to any element of Reyes-Gutierrez' alleged crime. Defense counsel's
cross examination question were directed toward whether a video was brought to court,
not whether the defense received a video. And if the existence of a disc was deemed a
relevant and admissible issue, then the City and the defense both suggested and
acknowledged there were alternative witnesses to provide any needed testimony.
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The City recognized they should seek an alternative to calling defense counsel as a
witness. R.415 ("I also don't know that the appropriate response is to call [defense
counsel] to ask her to testify about whether I provided her the video, whether she was
able to get it to work"), 417 ("I'm just concerned that otherwise I'll have to call [defense
counsel]"). In fact, the City volunteered that it had alternate means to present this
testimony. At the first trial, the City stated there were potential alternative witnesses,
~

rather than defense counsel or one of the prosecutors. R.417 ("there's a potential then that
we may need to bring in an additional witness whose [sic] not on the witness list, Officer
Faulkner or Officer Vicki Aubrey who attempted to assist with the working ... [to testify]
[t]hat the video was not working"); R.490 (City prosecutor Simmons attempted to view
the video with an officer during a break from trial and it didn't work). The Court
encouraged the parties to come up with an alternative witness, recognizing, at least
implicitly, it would be inappropriate to call an attorney as a witness when there was an
alternative available. R.429, 437. City prosecutor Simmons's explanation for not recalling either of the City's two alternative witnesses on the issue of the non-functioning
video is inadequate and fails to establish there was not an alternative to calling an
attorney. R.487, 490-492. Rather than exploring those alternative methods of offering
evidence of the video's non-functioning, the City pressured Reyes-Gutierrez into

VP

requesting a mistrial by continuing to insist on calling an attorney as a witness with the
knowledge that defense counsel would move for a mistrial if they did so. R.505-506.
Furthermore, defense counsel's cross-examination on the non-functional video
was appropriate, given the many instances where trial courts have allowed wide latitude
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in cross-examination regarding state's evidence that was lost or missing. See, e,g., State
v. Reaves, 414 S.C. 118, 128, 777 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 2015) (defense counsel was allowed
to forcefully cross-examine police officers' loss of evidence during their investigation);
State v. Barnes, 308 Conn. 38, 41-42, 60 A.3d 256 (Conn. 2013) (defendant permitted
wide latitude in cross-examination of state's witnesses regarding recordings that state
created but was unable to provide to the defense or produce at trial); State v. Pacheco,
145 N.M. 40, 48, 193 P.3d 587 (N.M. 2008) (defense was at liberty to cross-examine
about lost evidence and to argue the significance to the jury). City prosecutor Simmons
later agreed that none of defense counsel's video-related questions at trial elicited
inaccurate facts. R.497-500.
Fourth, the City continued the same strategy after defense counsel made it very
clear in the record that if the City attempted to call either herself or City prosecutor
Simmons as a witness, she would be forced to move for a mistrial. Based on the
statements made on the record, by the time the City definitively said it would call defense
counsel or the prosecutor as a witness, the City and the trial court knew the City's
decision would almost certainly cause the case to end in a mistrial. For example, there is
this exchange:
TRIAL COURT: "[I]f [the City] is going to call you as a witness you'll make a
motion for a mistrial."
DEFENSE COUNSEL: "That's right."
TRIAL COURT: "Right? And then I decide whether it's granted or not and the
City may not object to your motion for a mistrial because they've already asked
for a mistrial, right?"
R.430. Defense counsel objected as soon as the City announced it would call City
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prosecutor Simmons. R.438. The City made this decision in lieu of pursuing alternatives,
as the parties had discussed and the trial court advised, and with the knowledge that the
potential for a mistrial had been addressed several times that day.
Fifth, the City stipulated to a mistrial before Reyes-Gutierrez made his motion for
a mistrial, and then immediately stipulated to the mistrial once the motion was made. The
trial court heard argument from the parties and before the trial court's ruling on whether
to allow the prosecutor's testimony, the City said it would stipulate to a mistrial if ReyesGutierrez moved for one. R.440. This statement indicates the City foresaw their decision
would provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial, as well as the possibility that
the City knew they were asking the trial court to allow testimony that should not be
admitted. The fact that the City stipulated to Reyes-Gutierrez' mistrial motion before
counsel had even made the motion directly contradicts prosecutor Simmons' testimony at
June 29, 2015 motion hearing he "did not want a mistrial on the case" and that he
"wanted to finish the trial that day." R.486. It is irreconcilable to assert that it was not the
intent to of the prosecution to obtain a mistrial and when the City had actively stipulated
to defense counsel's motion for a mistrial before such motion was even made. See R.440
("Ms. Stirba hasn't told me yet she's moving for a mistrial if the City calls Mr. Simmons.
If she does, the city stipulates.").
Indeed, earlier in the trial, the trial court had indicated it would grant a mistrial if it
were stipulated by both parties. R.426 ("[I]f you all are stipulating to a mistrial, I mean
that's one of the things in State v. Manatau that if the defendant stipulates to a mistrial,
I'll tell you right now I'll grant it and I'll make a record that if it's retried there's no
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double jeopardy or things of that nature"). In its findings at the motion hearing, the trial
court recognized this was a case where the prosecutor may have strategically stipulated to
a mistrial. R.507 (the City's stipulation "may have been a tactical decision to avoid
appeal issues or other reasons ... "), 509 ("I acknowledge that the City's choice to stipulate
to the mistrial once made could have been a tactical decision ... "). Although the trial court
stated at the motion hearing that it would have allowed the City to put on some testimony
at trial, it did not state that it would have allowed the prosecutor to testify. R.508 ("I
would not have prohibited the City from putting on evidence [through] appropriate
witnesses or a witness ... "). On the day of the first trial however, the trial court explicitly
ruled that it would have allowed the City to call prosecutor Simmons to testify. R.442
(trial court's ruling that it would "allow Mr. Simmons to testify."). The City's stipulation
to a mistrial on these grounds implicitly acknowledges that the strategy with which the
City was proceeding was not proper and they were employing a strategy intended to force
a mistrial.
Additionally, in its denial of Reyes-Gutierrez' Motion to Bar Retrial, the trial court
did not specifically address the fact that it had granted the City's request to allow
prosecutor Simmons to testify about the video. This ruling gave the prosecution the very
remedy it was seeking to address the issue of the missing video. Yet, despite the trial
court's ruling in favor of the prosecution, prosecutor Veeru-Collins continued to insist the
parties were "at a stalemate" and affirmatively stipulated to defense counsel's motion for
a mistrial. R.442. Any purported "stalemate" between the parties was resolved once the
trial court ruled prosecutor Simmons would be allowed to testify. In other words, despite
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having the remedy it wanted, the prosecution still stipulated to Reyes-Gutierrez' mistrial
motion. This demonstrates that it was not the prosecution's intent to finish the trial that
had commenced on May 26, 2015, but that the intent of the City was to obtain a mistrial.
The trial court's findings never addressed the fact that the prosecution had the remedy it
was seeking, that the prosecution would have been allowed to call prosecutor Simmons to
address issues with the surveillance footage, and yet the City still affirmatively stipulated
to a mistrial.
Sixth, once the trial court declared a mistrial, the City immediately announced its
intent to file a 404(b) notice and motion in limine to exclude evidence or argument on the
absence of the video at trial. No reason was given for why the City had failed to file these
things before the first trial, other than the City's testimony at the motion hearing that it
was "surprised" by the mistake defense. R.496. On June 8, 2015, the City filed a 404(b)
Notice and a Motion in Limine to Deny the Admission of Prejudicial or Confusing
Evidence. R.115-116, 119-121. At the hearing to address Reyes-Gutierrez' Motion to Bar
Retrial, City prosecutor Simmons testified: "[I]f I'm forced to a mistrial. . .I'm going to do
things differently the second time around. I'm going to file a motion in limine to prevent
the whole issue from coming up. I'm going to present additional evidence ... with the
evidence of the prior convictions ... I thought it was appropriate to do it again. That's why
I didn't object." R.488-489.
Despite prosecutor Simmons' testimony to the contrary, the objective facts and
circumstances from the record indicate the City made strategic decisions to provoke
Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial after its own motion for a mistrial was denied.
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At the retrial, the City was able to rebut a defense of mistake (a defense the City admitted
it was surprised by at the first trial) with 404(b) evidence of Reyes-Gutierrez' prior
convictions for a similar offense which had been excluded from the first trial.
In sum, the objective facts from the record demonstrate an intent by the City to
provoke a mistrial request from the defense. The City never filed notice of intent to use
404(b) evidence to rebut a defense of mistake, the City admitted it was surprised by
Reyes-Gutierrez' mistake defense raised in the first trial, the City moved for its own
mistrial that the trial court denied. The trial court also denied the City's motion to
introduce 404(b) evidence during the first trial due to lack of proper notice. Once the
City's own motion for a mistrial was denied, the City engaged in a trial strategy (trying to
call Reyes-Gutierrez' trial counsel or the prosecutor) it had acknowledged was not
appropriate and a strategy which the City was on notice would cause Reyes-Gutierrez to
move for a mistrial. Despite the fact the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to
call prosecutor Simmons to testify about the missing surveillance footage and the City

~

still stipulated to Reyes-Gutierrez' motion for a mistrial knowing the trial court would
grant the motion. Finally, before the jury had even been excused, the prosecution
announced it would be filing 404(b) notice so that at the next trial the City would have a
more favorable opportunity to convict Reyes-Gutierrez.
It was plain error for the trial court to fail to find the City intended to obtain a
mistrial so that it could retry him under conditions it believed would be more favorable to
convict, namely with the admission into evidence of his prior convictions and a bar on
defense counsel's cross-examination on the missing surveillance video. See Lafferty,
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fd

2001 UT 19, iJ 149. Although the prosecutor testified at hearing that he did not intend to
obtain a mistrial, the Court should not expect a prosecutor "to admit he or she took
certain actions in an effort to goad the defense" into moving for a mistrial, but should
instead look to "the totality of what occurred." Parker, 391 S.C. at 614-615. Unlike the
facts in Kennedy, the City's misconduct consisted of more than one objectionable
question. Instead, the City made a number of deliberate decisions that provoked ReyesGutierrez into a mistrial motion, in order to be able to bring in Reyes-Gutierrez' prior
convictions at a later trial, as well as to prevent defense counsel from extensive crossexamination of the City's witnesses. There is no reason why the City failed to file a
404(b) notice before the first trial date and there is no reason why the City could not
anticipate adversarial cross-examination about lost evidence. Here, the clear weight of the
evidence available to the trial court should leave this Court with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." See Zenith, 395 U.S. at 123. The City
twice put Reyes-Gutierrez in jeopardy for this offense by retrying him after provoking a
mistrial request during the first trial. This offends both the state and federal double
jeopardy clauses.

~

33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

CONCLUSION

~

This Court should reverse and remand with an order of dismissal because ReyesGutierrez's retrial violated double jeopardy protections against multiple prosecutions for
the same offense.
SUBMITTED this 2d'aay of April, 2016.

l~A

~

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
RAFAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ,
Defendant.

Case No: 141911985 MO
VERNICE TREASE
Judge:
August 14, 2015
Date:

I

PRESENT
Clerk:
rebeccaf
Prosecutor: SIMMONS, BRANDON E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STIRBA, MELISSA G
Interpreter: Miguel Medina (Spanish)
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: Spanish
Date of birth: August 11, 1953
Audio
Tape Number:
W45
Tape Count: 12.27-12.37
CHARGES
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/30/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 358 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE

Defendant is taken forthwith to begin commitment.
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete SO hour(s) of community service.
Attorney Fees
Amount: $150.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
ORDER OF PROBATION

The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service.
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Case No: 141911985 Date:

Defendant to serve

7

Aug 14, 2015

day(s) jail.

PROBATION CONDITIONS
ECR Salt Lake County Probation.
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Salt Lake County Probation.
Pay monthly supervision fee as determined by probation agency.
Pay recoupment fee (attorney fees) as ordered.
Violate no laws.
No contact with victim(s).
Complete community service hours as directed by probation officer.
Undergo assessment to determine appropriate counseling. Enter and successfully complete
any recommended treatment.
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor associate with any
persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed
illegally.
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the request of any law
enforcement officer and/or probation agent.
No spice, ivory wave or items of that nature.
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.
Submit to search of person and/or property upon the request of any law enforcement
officer.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or frequent any place alcohol is the chief item
of sale.
Obtain and/or maintain full-time verifiable employment and/or schooling.
Defendant to be employed full-time or part-time if attending school.
Defendant is to complete a Thinking Errors class.
Defendant is trespassed from the Walmart where the incident occured.
Defendant is to report to Salt Lake County Probation Services immediately from bing
released from custody.

Date:
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MELISSA G. STIRBA (#15265)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,

MOTION TO BAR RETRIAL ON
DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. 141911985

RAFAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ,

THE HONORABLE VERNICE TREASE

Defendant.

Defendant, RAFAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ, by and through counsel, MELISSA G.
STIR.BA, hereby moves the Court to bar a retrial in this case as a retrial would violate the
Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy under both the United States and Utah
constitutions.
f)\

FACTUALBACKGROUND 1

\i;Jj/

The City filed an Information charging Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez with one count of retail theft
as a class A misdemeanor on October 22, 2014. A jury trial was held in this case on May 26,
2015. That trial ended in a mistrial after the Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the City's

1
These facts are based on the evidence presented at the May 26, 2015 jury trial in this matter and representations
counsel for the City made in open court. Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez proffers these facts solely for the purposes of this
Motion and does not admit these facts for any other purpose. Furthermore, the recitation of the facts from trial are
based on the audio recording of the trial but counsel for Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez has not had sufficient time to have a
transcript prepared. A transcript can be provided upon request.
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expressed intention to either call defense counsel as a witness against her own client or to call the
prosecuting trial attorney as a witness.
City's Motion for Mistrial

During the course of that trial, the City moved for a mistrial arguing that defense counsel
had improperly argued in opening statements that the conduct at issue in this case was human
error and a mistake - to wit: that Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez did not commit an act of retail theft, but
rather that he had inadvertently overlooked an item in his shopping cart while he was in the
process of checking out. The City argued to the Court that because Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez was not
planning on testifying, the City was entitled to a mistrial because it would not have an
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez.

The City also expressed discomfort at

having to argue carefully about the Defendant's decision not to testify. The City alternatively
argued that, despite not providing any notice as required under the rule or providing any
~

information about the factual circumstances of prior convictions, it should be allowed to bring in
evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404(b ).
Defense counsel objected to both a mistrial on those grounds and to the introduction of
404(b) evidence. The objection was based on (1) the fact that it was arguable based on the
evidence in the record that the Defendant's conduct was merely oversight and not an act of retail
theft, (2) that there had been no 404(b) notice as required by the rule, (3) the City's lack of
foresight about potential defenses to the charge of retail theft was not just cause to excuse noncompliance with the rule's notice requirement, and (4) that argument is not evidence and the
door to 404(b) evidence cannot be opened based on opening statements.
The Court denied the City's motion. The Court ruled that under State v. Manatau, 2014
UT 7, 322 P.3d 739, there was no basis for a mistrial based on the issue outlined by the City.
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The Court ruled arguments made in opening statement are not evidence from which any doors
can be opened.

Also, that there was sufficient evidence from the City's case-in-chief that

supported some or all of the statements made in opening argument. Additionally, the Court
admonished the City to be careful to avoid any burden-shifting in closing arguments.
The Defendant's Motion for Mistrial
After the Court had denied the City's motion for mistrial, the parties then addressed the
City's intention to call Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez's trial attorney as a witness against him in its casein-chief
By that point, the City called Malcolm Lendo, the asset protection manager, and Officer

cs

Tom Edmundson, the officer who cited Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez. During the cross-examination of
these two witnesses, defense counsel inquired as to whether surveillance footage of this alleged
event existed. Lendo testified that indeed surveillance footage did exist and that he had prepared
a disc of the footage. Lendo also testified that he gave that disc to Edmundson. Edmundson
testified that he never reviewed the video but that he did collect a disc that day. Defense counsel

01P

asked both witnesses if they brought the disc with them to court, and both indicated they had not.
Defense counsel then moved on to other areas of cross-examination.
The City never objected to this line of questioning. The City never asked for a bench
conference to address any concerns about this topic of cross-examination. And the City did not
try to rehabilitate its witnesses on re-direct examination to explain the lack of surveillance
footage.

Rather, at the break, the City requested a jury instruction telling the jury that a

videotape had been provided to the defense, that the disc is not functioning, and that neither side
has been able to get it to work. The City admitted that its decision not to object to the line of
questioning was tactical.
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The Court denied the motion for a jury instruction and informed the City it would have to
address this issue with testimony or other evidence. Brandon Simmons, the prosecuting attorney,
conceded that: "I also don't know that the appropriate response is to call Ms. Stirba to ask her to
testify about whether I provided the video and whether she was able to get it to work."
The Court took a recess at that point and when Court was back in session, the City had
changed its position about the appropriateness of calling Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez's defense attorney
and announced its intention to do so. At that point, defense counsel indicated that if the City
tried to call her as a witness in its case-in-chief, she would be forced to move for a mistrial.
After further discussion, the City changed tactics and indicated it would call Mr. Simmons to
testify about the fact that he provided a non-functioning disc to the defense. Again, defense
counsel indicated that if the City tried to call one of the prosecuting attorneys as a witness in its
case-in-chief, she would be forced to move for a mistrial.
The Court ruled that it would allow Mr. Simmons to be called as a witness. Based on that
ruling, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The City stipulated to the mistrial. Moreover, the
City also indicated it wanted Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez to personally consent to the mistrial. After
conferring with counsel, Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez consented to the mistrial and the Court granted the
motion.
Post-Mistrial Scheduling Conference and Court Filings

After the mistrial was declared, the Court held a brief scheduling conference to discuss
retrial dates. The Court suggested retrying the case the next day and the City indicated it would
be filing several motions and asked for a motion cut-off deadline. The City announced its
intention to file a 404(b) notice and motion in limine to exclude mention of the lost evidence.
On June 8, 2015, the City filed both a 404(b) Notice and a Motion in Limine to Deny the
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Admission of Prejudicial or Confusing Evidence.

ARGUMENT

I.

Retrial is Barred on Double Jeopardy Grounds Based on the City's Tactical
Goading of the Defendant into Moving for a Mistrial.
"In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury has been sworn and empaneled." State v.

Manatau, 2014 UT 7, ,I 9, 322 P.3d 739. Furthermore, "[d]eclaring a mistrial after jeopardy has
attached automatically invokes the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and
the Utah Constitution." Id.
Generally, when a criminal defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, there is no
double jeopardy bar against retrial. See generally Manatau, 2014 UT 7 at ,I 10, 322 P.3d 739.
However, an exception to this general rule exists where "the prosecutor's actions giving rise to
the motion for mistrial were done 'in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.'"
~

Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
611 (1979)) (alteration in the original). As the United States Supreme Court has held, '"[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to

<&)

provoke mistrial requests and thereby subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by
multiple prosecutions."' Id. at 674. As discussed below, the record indicates that when the
City's motion for a mistrial was denied, it attempted to get a mistrial by engaging in a trial

G0

strategy that (1) it conceded was not an appropriate strategy and (2) was designed to provoke the
Defendant into requesting a mistrial.

a. Although the General Rule When a Defendant Moves for a Mistrial is that
Retrial is Not Barred on Double Jeopardy Grounds, there is a Narrow
Exception to this General Rule for Certain Types of Prosecutorial
Misconduct.
Both the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have held that there are instances where
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retrial is barred after a mistrial is declared at the defendant's behest. The Supreme Court has
held that a "defendant's valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow
shell if the inevitable motion for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of
double jeopardy in all circumstances" and that the federal "Double Jeopardy Clause does protect
a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests." Kennedy, 456
U.S. at 673-74 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "double jeopardy can bar retrial for some types of
prosecutorial misconduct. It can bar retrial where a judge or prosecutor acts in bad faith with the
intent to provoke a mistrial in order to provide the prosecution with a more favorable opportunity
to convict." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ,r 149, 20 P.3d 342.
The Court in the instant case relied on Manatau when making a record that double
jeopardy does not bar retrial. However, under these circumstances, Manatau is not controlling
and Utah's Double Jeopardy Clause, as well as the double jeopardy clause of the United States
constitution, is still offended by a retrial even with the Defendant's consent.

b. The City's Conduct Demonstrates its Intent to Force a Mistrial So that it
Could Have a More Favorable Attempt to Convict Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez.

It is beyond dispute that the City wanted a mistrial in this case. In fact, before the issue
that was ultimately dispositive of the trial was argued, the City moved for a mistrial on other
grounds. The Court denied their motion and then the issue of calling Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez's trial
attorney was argued. At the beginning of that argument, it was the City's position that it would
not be appropriate to call defense counsel as a witness. However, after a recess and once defense
counsel would not stipulate to a factual proffer that improperly shifted the burden of proof, the
City amended its position and decided it would be necessary to call either defense counsel or
himself to the stand.
6
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Defense counsel made it very clear in the record that if the City attempted to call either
~

herself or Mr. Simmons as witnesses, she would be forced to move for a mistrial. Knowing this,
the City announced its intention was to call defense counsel or Mr. Simmons. The Court ruled
that the City could call Mr. Simmons and defense counsel moved for a mistrial on that ground.
The Court, at least implicitly agreeing that having the prosecutor call himself to the stand would
be improper and unfairly prejudicial, granted Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez's motion for a mistrial on
those grounds.
The City immediately stipulated to the mistrial. Again, a stipulation to a mistrial on these
grounds implicitly acknowledges that the strategy with which the City was proceeding was not
proper and they were employing a strategy intended to force a mistrial. Then the City indicated
that it wanted Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez to personally consent to the mistrial despite the fact that his
own counsel was the one moving for the mistrial. Mr. Simmons also put on the record that he
wanted to make sure that double jeopardy would not bar retrial and the Court made findings
under Manatau.
Then, before Court had adjourned, the City announced its intention to file a 404(b) notice
to bring in prior convictions (something the City had failed to do prior to the first trial) and a
motion in limine to exclude mention of the lost surveillance footage (something else the City
failed to do prior to trial). No reason was given for why the City had failed to file these things
before the first trial. On June 8, 2015, the City filed a 404(b) Notice and a Motion in Limine to
Deny the Admission of Prejudicial or Confusing Evidence.
In this case, the City's conduct at trial demonstrates an intention to provoke Mr. ReyesGutierrez to move for a mistrial. It is clear that the City had not anticipated that Mr. ReyesGutierrez would present a mistake defense at trial and had not filed the requisite 404(b) notice

7
~
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that would entitle the City to use past convictions at trial to rebut that defense. Once their
motion for mistrial was denied, the City went out of its way to engage in a tactical strategy that
would goad Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial based on the City's actions. First,
the City candidly admits that it did not object to defense counsel's line of questioning about the
lost evidence for tactical reasons. Second, the City did not ask for a bench conference to address
its concerns with this line of questioning. Third, the City represented to the Court that there were
other witnesses, besides Mr. Simmons and defense counsel, who could testify about the nonfunctionality of the video. Fourth, after defense counsel made it clear that she would move for a
mistrial if the City tried to call either herself or Mr. Simmons, the City indicated that was still its
intention. Fifth, as soon as defense counsel moved for a mistrial, the City immediately stipulated
to the mistrial motion.

Sixth, the City went out of its way to strong-arm the Defendant's

personal consent. And finally, the City announced its intention to file the 404(b) notice and
motion in limine before the jury had even been excused.

It is clear from this record that the City's conduct was intended to goad Mr. ReyesGutierrez into a mistrial so that it could retry him under conditions it believes are more favorable
to convict. There is no reason why the City failed to file a 404(b) notice before the appointed
trial date and there is no reason why the City could not anticipate adversarial cross-examination
about lost evidence.2 Yet the City is now trying to put Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez in jeopardy twice so
that it can remedy its deficient preparation for the first trial. This offends the Jeopardy Clauses
of both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, retrial should be
barred and the case should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez respectfully requests the Court grant
2

The issues caused by the loss of evidence are addressed in a separately filed motion to dismiss.
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this Motion to Bar Re-Prosecution on Double Jeopardy Grounds and dismiss the abovecaptioned case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of JUNE, 2015.

/s/ Melissa G. Stirba
MELISSA G. STIRBA
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake City
Prosecutor's Office, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 10 day of
JUNE, 2015.

Isl JL
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U.S. Const. amend. V

Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified
12/15/1791.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

~

~
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U tab Const. art. I, § 12
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-602
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting.
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of
such merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of value or any
other markings which aid in determining value of any merchandise displayed, held,
stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to purchase
such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the retail value
with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise;
or
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment from the container in or on which such merchandise is
displayed to any other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of the
retail value of such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of the
merchandise; or

~

(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile establishment with
the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.
(C) the offender has received written notice from the merchant prohibiting the
offender from entering the property pursuant to Section 78B-3-108; or
(iii) the actor has been twice before convicted of any of the offenses listed in
Subsections (I )(b)(ii)(A) through (1 )(b)(ii)(C), if each prior offense was committed
within 10 years of the date of the current conviction or the date of the offense upon which
the current conviction is based; or
(d)
as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $500 and
the theft is not an offense under Subsection (1 )( c).
Any individual who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or
(2)
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(1)(b)(iii), is civilly liable for
three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs
of suit and reasonable attorney fees.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-6 (2003)
77-1-6 Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense
is alleged to have been committed;

~

(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court
permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the
costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his
wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of
an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
~
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Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3. 7
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness unless:

(a)(l) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(a)(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or

(a)(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely
to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.]
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